

# RSA Algorithm

Compiled by - Nazmus Sakib Akash

# Cryptography & RSA Algorithm

Cryptography is about constructing and analyzing protocols that prevent third parties or the public from reading private messages.

- Cryptography can be broken down such as -
  1. Symmetric Cryptography : both the sender and receiver share the same key.
  2. Asymmetric Cryptography : uses pairs of keys: *public keys* which may be disseminated widely, and *private keys* which are known only to the owner. This is also known as *Public-key Cryptography*.
- RSA Algorithm is a type of Asymmetric Cryptography.

# RSA (Rivest–Shamir–Adleman) Algorithm

- Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman proposed the asymmetric RSA cryptosystem in 1977.
- Until now, RSA is the most widely use asymmetric cryptosystem although elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) becomes increasingly popular
- In RSA, the asymmetry is based on the practical difficulty of the factorization of the product of two large prime numbers known as the "factoring problem".

# RSA Algorithm Explained

*Suppose, two people named Alice and Bob want to communicate where Bob wants to send a message to Alice. An eavesdropper by the name of Eve is trying to listen into Bob's message.*

In RSA, there will be a pair of keys. Let's call the **encryption** key “**e**” which will be **the public key** while the **decryption** key is “**d**” which is **the private key**.

The public key in RSA is created based on *two large prime numbers*, along with an *auxiliary value*, **N** and sent from Alice to Bob (and Eve since she is snooping).

There is a Trapdoor One-Way Function working in the background.

# Trapdoor One-Way Function

-----> *Easy to compute*

$$m^e \pmod{N} = C$$

(Bob uses this formula to encrypt the message, **m** after receiving **e** and **N** from Alice and then sends encrypted message, **C** to Alice)

<----- *Difficult to compute*

$$?^e \pmod{N} = C$$

Even with the encrypted message, **C** and the public key, **e** with the auxiliary value, **N**, Eve cannot decrypt the message, **m** easily. Hence, a trapdoor is needed!

# Public & Private Exponents

Since Bob got the public exponent,  $e$  and the auxiliary value  $N$ , he encrypted his message as such -  $m^e \pmod{N} = C$ ,  $C$  being his encrypted message.

The public encryption key is  $\{e, N\}$

Now, to decipher this, the value of  $d$  (the private key) is necessary. With the help of  $d$ , Alice will decrypt the encrypted message  $C$  as such -  $C^d \pmod{N} = m$

The private encryption key is  $\{d, N\}$

So, from Bob and Alice's computations, we see that

$$m^{ed} \pmod{N} = m$$

We need to generate such exponents  $e$  and  $d$  and the auxiliary value,  $N$

# Key Generation Steps 1/5

The keys for the RSA algorithm are generated in the following way:

- 1. Choose two distinct prime numbers  $P_1$  and  $P_2$** 
  - For security purposes, the integers  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  should be chosen at random, and should be similar in magnitude but differ in length by a few digits to make factoring harder.
  - $P_1$  and  $P_2$  are kept secret.

For our problem, let's assume that  $P_1 = 53$  and  $P_2 = 59$ .

- 2. Calculate  $N = P_1 * P_2$**

$$N = 53 * 59 = 3127$$

# Key Generation Steps 2/5

## 3. Compute $\Phi(N) = (P_1-1) * (P_2-1)$

Note:  $\Phi(N)$  is the PHI function of N and it refers to how many integers are less than or equal to N that do not share any common factors with N.

*Derivation:* For prime numbers -  $\Phi(P) = P-1$

$$\text{Also, } \Phi(A*B) = \Phi(A) * \Phi(B)$$

$$\text{So, } \Phi(N) = \Phi(P_1) * \Phi(P_2)$$

$$\Rightarrow \Phi(N) = (P_1-1) * (P_2-1)$$

For our problem,  $\Phi(N) = 52 * 58 = 3016$



## Key Generation Steps 3/5

**4. Select the public exponent  $e \in \{1, 2, \dots, \Phi(N)-1\}$  and  $e$  is coprime with  $N$  and  $\Phi(N)$**

In our problem,  $e$  can be selected as 3.

$\Phi(N) = 3016$ . So  $e = 3$  lies between 1 and  $\Phi(N)$  which fulfills the first condition.

Also, 3016 is not divisible by 3 so,  $e$  is coprime with  $\Phi(N)$ . Similarly, 3127 is not divisible by 3 and so,  $e$  is coprime with  $N$ . Thus,  $e = 3$  fulfills the second condition.

# Key Generation Steps 4/5

**5. Choose the Private Exponent, d such that -**

$$\mathbf{d = ( k * \Phi(N) + 1 ) / e}$$

This is derived from Euler's theorem -  $m^{\Phi(N)} = 1 \pmod{N}$

$\Rightarrow m^{\Phi(N)*k} = 1 \pmod{N}$  [Since  $1^k = 1$ ]  $\Rightarrow m * m^{\Phi(N)*k} = m \pmod{N}$  [Since  $1*m = m$ ]

$$\Rightarrow \mathbf{m^{\Phi(N)*k+1} = m \pmod{N}}$$

Previously, we established  $m^{ed} = m \pmod{N}$

So,  $ed = k*\Phi(N) + 1 \Rightarrow \mathbf{d = ( k*\Phi(N) + 1 ) / e}$

# Key Generation Steps 5/5

**Using  $d = (k * \Phi(N) + 1) / e$  on our example -**

$$d = (2 * 3016 + 1) \setminus 3 = 2011$$

For calculating  $d$ , we need the random value  $k$ . The value of  $k$  will be an integer value for which  $d$  is an integer and not a fraction.

Similarly, if we selected  $k = 5$ , we would find another possible value of  $d$  -

$$d = (5 * 3016 + 1) \setminus 3 = 5027$$

# Implementation Details

- The RSA cryptosystem uses only one arithmetic operation (modular exponentiation) which makes it conceptually a simple asymmetric scheme
- Even though conceptually simple, due to the use of very long numbers, RSA is orders of magnitude slower than symmetric schemes, e.g., DES, AES
- When implementing RSA (esp. on a constrained device such as smart cards or cell phones) close attention has to be paid to the correct choice of arithmetic algorithms

# Attacks and Countermeasures 1/3

There are two distinct types of attacks on cryptosystems

- **Analytical attacks** try to break the mathematical structure of the underlying problem of RSA
- **Implementation attacks** try to attack a real-world implementation by exploiting inherent weaknesses in the way RSA is realized in software or hardware

# Attacks and Countermeasures 2/3

RSA is typically exposed to these analytical attack vectors -

## Mathematical attacks

- The best known attack is factoring of  $N$  in order to obtain  $\phi(N)$
- Can be prevented using a sufficiently large modulus  $N$
- The current factoring record is 664 bits. Thus, it is recommended that  $n$  should have a bit length between 1024 and 3072 bits

## Protocol attacks

- Exploit the malleability of RSA, i.e., the property that a ciphertext can be transformed into another ciphertext which decrypts to a related plaintext – without knowing the private key
- Can be prevented by proper padding

# Attacks and Countermeasures 3/3

Implementation attacks can be one of the following -

## **Side-channel analysis**

- Exploit physical leakage of RSA implementation (e.g., power consumption, EM emanation, etc.)

## **Fault-injection attacks**

- Inducing faults in the device while CRT is executed can lead to a complete leakage of the private key

# Summary

- RSA is the most widely used public-key cryptosystem
- RSA is mainly used for key transport and digital signatures
- The public key  $e$  can be a short integer, the private key  $d$  needs to have the full length of the modulus  $n$
- RSA relies on the fact that it is hard to factorize  $n$
- Currently 1024-bit cannot be factored, but progress in factorization could bring this into reach within 10-15 years. Hence, RSA with a 2048 or 3076 bit modulus should be used for long-term security
- A naïve implementation of RSA allows several attacks, and in practice RSA should be used together with padding